This report presents a series of options for intexjurisdictional river basin institutions for consideration by the Northern River Basins Study (NRBS). It has two primary objectives. First, it develops a framework to guide the NRBS in the process of institutional design. Second, it describes a series of models that could be adopted for an intexjurisdictional body in the Northern River Basins.
The central elements of the framework for institutional design are set out in Section 2. This section begins by discussing a series of paired concepts that have important implications for institutional arrangements. These concepts are: governmental versus non-governmental responsibilities; technical versus political issues; power versus influence; and centralization versus decentralization. These concepts define the general options to be considered in institutional design. A list of specific questions is then presented, illustrating the type of decision path that should be followed in the selection of particular institutions. Answers to these questions establish what type of institution is appropriate for particular policy objectives and contexts. Finally, Section 2 discusses a number of possible purposes and functions for an intexjurisdictional body in the Northern River Basins. The most important implications for institutional design of each purpose and function are noted.
Sections 3 to 6 of this report set out four different models for intexjurisdictional institutional arrangements: the intergovernmental model; the independent commission model; the government- driven inclusive model; and the stakeholder-driven inclusive model. For each model, a general description of its principal characteristics is followed by a number of case studies illustrating its application.
The intergovernmental model has been the preferred option to date in Canada’s intexjurisdictional watersheds. An agreement between governments establishes a body, usually comprised of water managers, to oversee implementation of an intergovernmental agreement and to facilitate interagency coordination. Stakeholders are usually not involved in these bodies, which generally have had fairly narrow and technical mandates. The Mackenzie River Basin Transboundary Waters Master Agreement, however, provides for a board which includes membership from the parties and First Nations. This agreement, if ratified by all governments, will establish an important intergovernmental institution in the Northern River Basins. The discussion of the intergovernmental model also distinguishes the general experience with interstate compacts in the United States from the situation prevailing in Canada, and describes a significant intergovernmental body concerned with water management in the Columbia basin in the American northwest.
The independent commission model involves the appointment by government of an arm’s length institution with a defined mandate. While these bodies are usually advisory, they may be influential if they establish credibility within government and have a sufficiently high public profile. Adequate resources and access to technical expertise are also important. This model is illustrated by the International Joint Commission, a body created by Canada and the United States with responsibilities relating to boundary waters. It has been used in British Columbia to address contentious issues of resource and environmental management through the creation of a consensus oriented land-use planning process. It has also been used to provide an independent watchdog of government activities.
Government-driven inclusive bodies have become increasingly popular in Canada as a way of providing stakeholder input into policy-making. They may also be used to resolve conflicts between stakeholder groups. These processes are government-driven in that they are usually initiated and funded by government. Representatives of different sectors are selected and a specific objective or more general mandate is defined. At this point, the participants may take an active role in process design. These bodies may be used for a wide range of functions, from defining general principles for resource management to recommending specific policy or legislative initiatives. As illustrated by the NRBS, multistakeholder bodies can also coordinate an interdisciplinary research project directed at improving resource management. The government-driven inclusive model is illustrated by initiatives in the Fraser Basin, round tables, institutional arrangements in Chesapeake Bay, and the Chelan Agreement in Washington.
The final option is the stakeholder-driven inclusive model. These multistakeholder arrangements are the product of diverse interests coming together to address a common problem or to resolve a significant dispute. Frequently, they reflect dissatisfaction with governmental water management institutions, traditional patterns of interest-group politics, and dispute resolution through political and legal channels. While these bodies have significant obstacles to overcome in establishing trust among participants and finding adequate resources, they have been successful in some circumstances in addressing previously intractable issues. Being independent of government may allow them to undertake an oversight or watchdog function. If they develop sufficient credibility, they may also play a significant advisory role.
The final section of this report sets out a practical approach to institutional design. This "modular" approach involves two steps: the selection of individual modules and the establishment of an overall institutional structure or architecture. Modules are selected to achieve specified policy objectives and to fit particular circumstances. The interrelations between modules is determined at the level of institutional architecture. This approach is proposed as a means of dividing the complex task of institutional design facing the NRBS into more manageable components.