<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="6.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sharp, H.</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Giant fish, giant otters, and dinosaurs: &quot;Apparently irrational beliefs' in a Chipewyan community</style></title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">1987</style></year></dates><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">American Ethnologist</style></publisher><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">14</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">226-235</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">en</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Dan Sperber's recent formulations of Rationalism advocate a form of cognitive reductionism in the interpretation of &quot;apparently irrational beliefs&quot; that is contingent upon a linear model of brain functioning analogous to the operations of a computer. This paper considers several nonexistent beings among the Chipewyan, arguing that such reductionism is invalid. As shared forms, their meaning is consistently indeterminate and temporally nonlinear, invalidating the assumptions of a Rationalist approach.</style></abstract><issue><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2</style></issue><custom3><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/482353879</style></custom3><custom4><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">CEMA</style></custom4></record></records></xml>